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 ‘CHARTER’ NOT REQUIRED 
PRIOR TO SAFETY SEARCH 
R. v. T.A.V., 2001 ABCA 316 
 
As a result of a wiretap, police 
 
• Criminal Code: s.117.02 
• common law: investigatory safety search 
 
Criminal Code 
 
Section 117.02 of the Criminal Code permits the 
warrantless search of a person in exigent received information that two girls 
traveling together would be going 
from Vancouver to Edmonton on a bus 
carrying firearms and perhaps 
narcotics. Police attended the bus depot and followed 
two girls, one of whom was the accused, as they left 
the depot; each carrying a bag. Police approached the 
girls and identified themselves. When asked, the girls 
stated they were coming from Vancouver.  The accused 
also produced a paper with an address and the girls 
were described as being “quite agitated”. One girl was 
arrested and Chartered for possession of a firearm 
after an officer opened her bag and found a gun. A 
second officer arrested and Chartered the accused for 
possession of a concealed weapon after he felt and saw 
the butt of a gun in the accused’s bag. At headquarters 
however, the girls gave their dates of birth and at this 
time it was recognized they were young offenders.  
They were then given the warnings pursuant to s.56 of 
the Young Offenders Act (YOA) and their bags were 
searched and the contents photographed. As a result, a 
revolver, pistol, and ammunition were found in the 
accused’s bag while a gun with a silencer, a second 
silencer, and ammunition were found in the other girl’s 
bag. At trial, the accused was convicted of five counts 
of illegally possessing weapons.   
 
The accused appealed her convictions to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the 
evidence should have been excluded because the police 
violated her rights at the time of the initial detention 
under s.8 (search and seizure) and s.10 (right to 
counsel) of the Charter as well as the special rights 
afforded young persons under s.56 of the YOA. Since 
the search of the accused’s bag was warrantless, the 
Crown had the burden of proving that the search was 
nonetheless reasonable. Two reasons were offered to 
demonstrate that the search was authorized: 
 
circumstances if the officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe a weapon offence has been or is being 
committed and evidence is likely to be found on the 
person. In upholding the trial judge’s finding that 
exigent circumstances existed and it was not 
practicable to obtain a warrant, McClung J.A. for the 
unanimous court stated: 
 
"Exigent" indicates in dictionary usage, the "requiring of 
immediate action or aid; pressing, urgent" or "[a] state of 
pressing need; a time of extreme necessity; a critical 
occasion, or one that requires immediate action or 
remedy; an emergency, extremity, strait" … Practically 
speaking, this involves the presence of "emergency-like 
circumstances as for example the presence of weapons in 
a motor vehicle stopped on a highway" or where " police 
action literally must be `now or never' to preserve the 
evidence of the crime" … Therefore, in the case of a 
warrantless search of a home, exigent circumstances may 
permit the search where it is necessary to prevent 
imminent bodily harm or death, or where it is necessary 
to prevent imminent loss or destruction of evidence…  
 
…here the officers did not know the identities of the two 
suspects on the bus, nor did they confirm that they had 
indeed arrived in Edmonton until mere minutes before 
they were detained as they left the bus station. In 
making the finding that there were exigent 
circumstances, the trial judge assessed the relevant time 
period to be that arising after 11:00 at the bus depot. 
This is a reasonable finding given the evidence led before 
him. (references omitted)  
   
Common Law 
 
Alberta’s top court also held the search to be justified 
under the common law power of search incidental to a 
lawful detention based on an articulable cause a 
detainee is involved in criminal behaviour. Articulable 
cause is a lower standard than reasonable grounds and 
is defined as "a constellation of objectively discernible 
facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause 
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 to suspect that the detainee is criminally implicated in 
the activity under investigation". Even if the officers 
did not have reasonable grounds, the wiretap 
information and their observations at the bus depot 
provided at least an articulable cause to suspect the 
girls were involved in criminal behaviour. Since the 
officers were legitimately concerned with their 
personal safety, the search was justified as an incident 
to the detention. The Court, at para. 30-31: 
 
The power to search upon detention is coupled to the 
need to assure the safety of police officers, as well as 
other citizens. Therefore officers are given the right to 
search and are given latitude in order to protect 
themselves…. It is a power which extends to a search for 
weapons where the circumstances indicate that such a 
concern is real… In a brief detention, such as here, the 
focus expands from investigation to the protection of 
involved officers… 
 
The seriousness of the circumstances leading to the 
detention dictate whether there will be a search as well 
as its scope… The common-law power to search pursuant 
to detention or arrest is not an unlimited power, but a 
frisk search has gained acceptance as a minimal 
intrusion… Here a search for weapons in the bags of the 
suspects was justified due to the probability of criminal 
activity attending the possession of handguns. 
(references omitted) 
 
Right to Counsel 
 
Having found the accused detained, the court 
addressed whether a failure to give a warning of the 
right to counsel was a breach of the Charter, thus 
affecting the reasonableness of the search. In the 
circumstances, the Court found that if the search was 
conducted to protect the officers no s.10(b) violation 
could “logically” be made out:  
 
A failure to give a warning of the right to counsel was 
held to be relevant to the reasonableness of a search. 
However, it has been questioned whether this 10(b) 
warning must always be given immediately upon detention 
or upon every detention… When a brief search is 
conducted to ensure the safety of the officers involved, 
it seems implausible that this must be preceded by a 
10(b) warning.  
 
And further: 
 
Here, if the right to search pursuant to a lawful 
detention is in place to protect the safety of the 
officers, it is not likely to be undone by a failure to first 
warn of a right to counsel… 
 
Section 56 YOA 
 
Section 56 of the YOA, “intended to ensure there is no 
improper questioning of young persons”, provides a 
statutory mechanism to exclude statements improperly 
obtained for non-compliance. However, s.56 applies only 
to oral or written statements and does not include the 
suppression of physical evidence: The Court, at para. 
34.   
 
Section 56 is merely a rule of evidence about 
incriminating statements, and it does not hamper 
investigation… [I]f another Charter violation is proven, s. 
24(2) still applies to youths. This same difficulty lies with 
[the accused’s] s. 10(b) argument: if the police had the 
right to perform a search for weapons without having to 
first give a warning or opportunity to contact parents or 
counsel, the weapons would have been discovered before 
any duty arose under s. 10(b) or any sections of the YOA 
. (references omitted) 
 
Since there were no Charter infringements, there was 
no basis to exclude the evidence. Furthermore the 
Court ruled, even if there had been a Charter breach 
there was no reason to exclude the non-conscriptive 
real evidence under s.24(2) because the admission of 
the firearms was not likely to bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. 
 
Editor’s note: It must be noted that the failure to 
provide the s.10(b) warning in this case was assessed in 
relation to whether the protective search was 
unreasonable and not as a consequence of an 
incriminatory statement being obtained. It appears the 
law is unsettled on the admissibility of a statement 
obtained from an accused following an investigative 
detention but prior to a Charter warning. Although the 
s.10(b) right to counsel imports temporal immediacy1 
and is not engaged by the length of the detention2, 
some courts suggest that the right to counsel need not 
be provided during the early stages of an investigative 
detention. For example, in R. v. Clough and Watts 2000 
BCPC 0160, Gordon J. stated, at para 24: 
 
[I]t seems ridiculous to suggest that a citizen who is 
detained briefly at the roadside such that a speeding 
ticket can be issued has a right to counsel. Neither does 
a citizen who is to be briefly detained for articulable 
cause such that the police can investigate an offence 
that is being or has been recently committed entitled to 
counsel. To hold otherwise would totally frustrate the 
day-to-day work of police officers. (emphasis added) 
                                                 
1 R. v. Feeney[1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, R. v. Poloshek ( ) 134 C.C.C. (3d) 187 (Ont.C.A.) 
2 R. v Elshaw (1991) 67 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) at p.125 
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 In R. v. Reid [2000] O.J. No. 2969 (Ont.Crt.Jus.), 
Sparrow J. suggests the immediacy of s.10(b) rights 
does not "necessitate unreasonable conduct on the part 
of the police" and the police "must be permitted to 
react sensibly on the spur of the moment", perhaps to 
ask a question or two. In R. v. Dupuis (1995) 162 A.R. 
197 (Alta.C.A.), police entered a residence in pursuit of 
a suspect and at gunpoint required the occupants to lie 
down. The Court "concluded the police could detain 
while they pursued their enquiries without violating 
s.10(b) of the Charter"3. However, the police are not 
required to advise the detainee of the right to counsel 
before they are searched. The police are entitled to 
pursue their investigation to a point where any risk of 
violence is removed before providing s.10(b) rights4. In 
order to avoid the issue altogether, it may be prudent 
for the officer to provide the Charter warning in a 
pre-emptive fashion prior to questioning. However, 
whether such an obligation arises in law remains 
unclear. 
 
Complete case at www.albertacourts.ca 
 
 
WARRANT VALID DESPITE 
IRRELEVANT INFORMATION 
R. v. Lam, 2002 BCCA 99 
 
The accused appealed his 
convictions for production of a 
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It is important that the Information be examined as a 
whole and not one piece of evidence at a time, because 
each piece of evidence colours other pieces of evidence 
and a fuller picture emerges by considering all the 
evidence together. That does not justify including 
material that is irrelevant but relevance can only be 
tested in relation to the total picture painted in the 
Information. 
 
In this case, the power consumption, drawn curtains, 
neglected house, burnt out lawn, and registration of a 
vehicle to a house where a previous grow operation had 
been found, when taken together, were sufficient to 
support the warrant. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST: 
TAKING A LOOK! 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
A police officer has the 
authority, deeply rooted in 
common law, to search a 
person incidental to arrest. 
This search authority is 
discretionary, does not impose 
a duty to search, and if the 
police officer is satisfied that 
the law may be effectively and safely applied without a 
Vo
M 
controlled substance and 
possession for the purpose of 
trafficking arguing the 
ormation to obtain (ITO) was not capable of 
porting the warrant when all the irrelevant 
ormation was removed from it. Furthermore, even if 
at remained was sufficient to support the warrant, 
e irrelevant information “made the judicial task of 
ciding whether the information was capable of 
porting” the warrant too difficult and it should be 
 aside. 
hough the Court agreed that there was a significant 
ount of irrelevant material in the ITO, it disagreed 
h what was truly irrelevant, marginally relevant, or 
ly relevant. Lambert J. for the unanimous appeal 
urt wrote: 
                                             
e comments of William J. in Swansburg v. Smith (1996) Docket:CA019235 
.C.A.) 
 v. Lal (1996) Docket:CC940845 (B.C.S.C.) affirmed [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446 
.C.A.) leave to appeal to dismissed [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.), 
search, the officer may choose not to search5. 
 
Requirements 
 
The are three requirements necessary for a search to 
be reasonable as an incident to a lawful arrest6: 
 
¾ a lawful arrest. The 
lawfulness of the search 
derives from the legality of 
the arrest7. If the arrest is 
not lawful, the resulting search will not be lawful 
either. In many cases, the belief that reasonable 
grounds for arrest exist is a condition precedent 
to a valid arrest8. In the absence of reasonable 
grounds upon which to base the arrest, any search 
conducted will also be invalid9.  
 
                                                 
5 Cloutier v. Langlois & Bedard (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.) 
6 Stillman v. the Queen [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.) 
7 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.) 
8 R. v. Belnavis (1996) 107 C.C.C. (3d) 195 (Ont.C.A.) at p.213. 
9 See R. v. Young (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 559 (Ont.C.A.) at p.565. 
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 ¾ the search must be conducted as an “incident” 
to the arrest. The purpose or objective of the 
search must in some way be "connected" or 
"related10" to the arrest and the manner and scope 
of the search must bear some reasonable 
relationship to the offence suspected and the 
evidence sought11. Searching does not envelop 
purposes that have no connection to the reason for  
the arrest12. For example, a vehicle inventory 
search based solely on departmental policy cannot 
be justified as an incident to arrest13. Nor would a 
search for improper police motives such as suspect 
intimidation or public ridicule.  Valid objectives of 
a search incidental to a lawful arrest include14: 
 
 
• ensuring the safety of the 
police and public. The police 
have a right to protect 
themselves and a duty to 
protect the public, including the arrestee, from 
threats to their physical well being. Not only must 
the arresting officer be concerned with their own 
safety, they must ensure the safety of other 
personnel within the criminal justice system who 
may be in contact with the arrestee such as jail 
guards, Sheriffs, or court staff. Instruments that 
may aid the arrestee in escape are also of concern 
during a search of this nature. 
 
• protecting or discovering 
evidence. The police are entitled 
to secure or discover evidence 
related to the arrest. For example, 
a search following a drug arrest 
warrants a search for drug related 
evidence, but not pornography. In 
this way, what the police are looking for must be 
associated to the reason for the arrest. If the 
police "contrive" an arrest at a particular location 
as a camouflage or subterfuge to justify the 
subsequent search, the search would fall outside 
the scope15.  
 
¾ the search must be conducted in a reasonable 
manner. The physical manner or method of the 
search must be carried out in a just and proper 
fashion. The search must not be conducted by 
abusive means and the nature of the search must 
be proportionate to the objectives of the search 
and other circumstances of the situation. Although 
a search may be uncomfortable, such as a search 
that requires the removal and seizure of clothing, 
it is not necessarily unreasonable.  
                                                 
10 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.) 
11 R. v. I.D.D. (1987) 38 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Sask.C.A.) 
12 R. v. Belnavis (1996) 107 C.C.C. (3d) 195 (Ont.C.A.) at p.213. 
13 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.) 
14 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.) 
15 R. v. Lim (No. 2) (1990), 1 C.R.R. (2d) 136 (Ont.H.C.J.), R. v. Concepcion (1994), 48 
B.C.A.C. 44 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 27 
 
Exigent Circumstances 
 
Search incidental to arrest is an exception to the 
unreasonable presumption of a warrantless search16. It 
is not necessary for the officer to believe that exigent 
circumstances exist or that it would be impracticable 
to obtain a warrant before conducting the search17. 
The presumption of unreasonableness is rebutted by a 
lawful arrest18. 
 
Reasonable Grounds 
 
Although the arresting officer must possess 
reasonable grounds to effect the arrest, the existence 
of an independent belief that the person arrested has 
weapons or evidence on their person or in their 
immediate surrounding area is not required19. 
Reasonable grounds to justify arrest must pre-exist 
the search. If however, the search provides the 
reasonable grounds for the arrest, the search cannot 
be justified as an incident to the arrest20.  
  
                                                
Timing of the Search 
 
If a search is carried out after an arrest, there is no 
requirement that the search be conducted immediately 
following the arrest. Postponing a search to a later 
time or place does not defeat the reasonableness of a 
search. However, this does not provide an unqualified 
right to search anytime after an arrest. The delay 
from the time of arrest to the time of search must be 
reasonable and the police will be required to give some 
explanation as to why the search was delayed21. A 
search may also be conducted prior to an arrest 
provided the officer has reasonable grounds to arrest 
 
16 R. v. Golub (1997) 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont.C.A.), Stillman v. the Queen [1997] 1 
S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.)., R. v. Golden 2001 SCC 83 
17 R. v. Smellie (1994) 95 C.C.C. (3d) 9 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Drapeua (1993) 39 B.C.A.C. 
237 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Shynuk [1997] B.C.J. No.265 (B.C.C.A.) appeal to S.C.C. 
dismissed [1997] S.C.C.A. No.151. 
18 R. v. Klimchuk (1991) 67 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (B.C.C.A.),  
19 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.), Cloutier & Langlois v. Bedard 
(1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.), R. v. M. (M.R.) [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.), R. v. 
Morrison (1987) 35 C.C.C. (3d) 437 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Polashek (199) 134 C.C.C. (3d) 
187 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Golub (1997) 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont.C.A.) 
20 R. v. Belnavis (1996) 107 C.C.C. (3d) 195 (Ont.C.A.) at p.213. 
21 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.), R. v. Copan (1994) 39 B.C.A.C. 
307 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Miller (1987), 38 C.C.C. (3d) 252 (Ont.C.A.) 
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 the person before the search22; the arrest may not be 
incidental to the search and independent reasonable 
grounds to arrest must exist irrespective of the 
outcome of the search23. Thus, an otherwise "unlawful" 
arrest would not become lawful merely because the 
officer discovered evidence.  
 
SCOPE 
 
A search incidental to arrest includes a search of the 
arrestee and is extended to encompass a search of the 
immediate surroundings of the arrest location24.  
Although the courts have not attempted a 
comprehensive definition of the words “immediate 
surroundings”25, immediate surroundings is a broader 
and a less restrictive standard than the area within the 
"immediate control" of the arrestee26. 
 
Personal Searches 
 
Canadian jurisprudence has divided the search of a 
person into essentially four distinct categories27: 
  
• "pat down" or "frisk" search 
• "strip" or "skin" search 
• "body cavity" search 
• "bodily substance" search 
 
It is without dispute that the police have the power to 
frisk, or “pat down” an arrestee. A frisk search is a 
"relatively non-intrusive 
procedure: outside clothing 
 
    
22 R
(B.C
23 R
(198
R. v
195
24 C
34 C
Cha
(B.C
25 R
26 R
27 S
607
28 C
Strip or skin searches (disrobing), requiring the 
removal of an arrestee's clothing, is greater an affront 
to human dignity than a frisk or pat-down search. 
Although a search incidental to arrest does not 
generally require reasonable grounds beyond the 
grounds necessary to support the arrest, an exemption 
to this common rule exists in cases of strip searches29. 
Strip searches represent a significant invasion of 
privacy, and are often humiliating, degrading, and 
traumatic experiences. To undertake this type of 
intrusive search, the officer must possess reasonable 
grounds justifying the strip search in addition to 
justifying the arrest.  Strip searches carried out as a 
matter of routine or policy, or abusively or for the 
purpose of humiliating or punishing the arrestee will be 
unreasonable. Furthermore, the strip searches should 
be conducted at the police station unless there are 
exigencies requiring the search be conducted in the 
field. For practical purposes, the following points are 
noteworthy30: 
 
• Although permissible as an incident to arrest, strip 
searches are presumptively unreasonable and the 
onus lies with the police in justifying the search. 
• In conducting a strip search the police must 
possess reasonable grounds that the search is 
necessary for safety or evidentiary concerns. 
These reasonable grounds are independent from 
the grounds justifying the arrest. Mere possibility 
that a person has weapons or evidence upon their 
person is insufficient. 
Vo
Mis patted down to determine 
whether there is anything on 
the person of the arrested 
individual. Pockets may be 
examined but the clothing is 
not removed "28.  
 
 
                                             
. v. Debot (1987) 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Lee [1993] B.C.J. No.1220 
.S.C.) 
. v. Debot (1986) 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (Ont.C.A.) affirmed on other grounds 
9) 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.), R. v. Tomaso (1988), 70 C.R. (3d) 152 (Ont.C.A..), 
. Charlton (1992) 15 B.C.A.C. 272 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Belnavis (1996) 107 C.C.C. (3d) 
 (Ont.C.A.) 
loutier & Langlois v. Bedard (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.), R. v. Wong (1987) 
.C.C. (3d) 51 (Ont.C.A.) affirmed (1990) 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.)., R. v. 
rlton (1992) 15 B.C.A.C. 272 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Smellie (1994) 95 C.C.C. (3d) 9 
.C.A.),  
. v. Concepcion (1994) 48 B.C.A.C. 44 (B.C.C.A.) 
. v. Lim (No.2) (1990) 1 C.R.R. (2d) 136 (Ont.H.C.J.) 
ee R. v. Simmons [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Stillman [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
 (S.C.C.). 
loutier & Langlois v. Bedard (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.) 
• Searches conducted as a matter of routine or 
policy, or to humiliate or punish are unreasonable. 
• There is a distinction between strip searches on 
arrest and strip searches related to safety in full 
custodial settings such as a prison. The 
appropriateness of routine strip searches of 
individuals integrated into a prison population 
cannot be used to justify strip searches of 
individuals briefly detained by police or held 
overnight in cells. Although police officers have 
legitimate concerns that short term detainees may 
conceal weapons, these concerns cannot justify 
routine strip searches of all arrestees and must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
• Strip searches are to be generally conducted at a 
police station except in cases of exigent 
circumstances where the police have reasonable 
grounds to believe that the search is necessary in 
                                                 
29 R. v. Golden 2001 SCC 83 
30 R. v. Golden 2001 SCC 83 
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 the field such as an urgency to search for weapons 
that could be used to harm the officer, others, or 
the arrestee. 
• A person should be provided the opportunity to 
remove items themselves or the assistance or 
advice of trained medical professionals should be 
sought to ensure material can be safely removed. 
 
Whether the search was conducted out of public view 
or whether the officer conducting the search was the 
same gender as the arrestee will also be important 
factors in assessing the reasonableness of the search. 
 
It is clear from jurisprudence that a high level of 
justification will be required if a search of body 
cavities is conducted31. Assistance of trained medical 
personnel aiding in the search will also be assessed in 
the overall reasonableness. 
 
Taking biological samples of an arrestee as an incident 
to arrest is an exemption to the common law power. In 
Stillman v. the Queen [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.) the 
police took hair and saliva samples, as well as dental 
impressions from the accused who had refused to 
provide them. In addressing whether the samples were 
lawfully obtained incidental to arrest, Cory J. for the 
majority, at para. 49 held: 
 
The common law power of search incidental to arrest 
cannot be so broad as to encompass the seizure without 
valid statutory authority of bodily samples in the face of 
a refusal to provide them. (emphasis added) 
 
Vehicle Searches 
 
 
Vehicles are "legitimately 
the objects of search 
incident to lawful arrest as 
they attract no heightened 
expectation of privacy that 
would justify an exemption from the usual common law 
principles"32. The power to search may even extend to 
include a motor vehicle from which the person had 
emerged at or shortly before the time of their 
arrest33. Provided the search is rationally connected to 
the arrest (safety, evidence), “there is no logical 
reason that the entirety of what may be reasonably 
said to be the surroundings ought not to be 
searched"34. This may include trunks of motor vehicles, 
which are not necessarily taboo35. 
                                                 
31 R. v. Greffe [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755 (S.C.C.) 
32 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.), see also R. v. Smellie (1994) 95 
C.C.C. (3d) 9 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Poleshek (199) 134 C.C.C. (3d) 187 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. 
Drapeau [1993] B.C.J. No.2528 (B.C.C.A.) 
33 R. v. Klimchuk (1991) 67 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (B.C.C.A.), see also R. v. Brezak [1950] 2 
D.L.R. 265 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Vu (1998) 118 B.C.A.C. 162 (B.C.C.A.) 
 
In R. v. Smellie (1994) 95 C.C.C. (3d) 9 (B.C.C.A.) leave 
to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1997) C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.)  
the accused argued that the search, which included the 
removal of a door panel, was not within the scope of 
search incidental to arrest. The Court held that 
previous judgements "make it clear that in searching a 
vehicle as an incident of arrest the police are entitled 
to at least search the interior of a vehicle as well as 
the trunk".  
 
In R. v. Speid (1991) 8 C.R.R. (2d) 383 (Ont.C.A.), leave 
to appeal to S.C.C. denied [1992], 1 S.C.R. ix, police 
were refused the issuance of a search warrant by a 
justice of the peace. Police nevertheless proceeded 
with a search of the accused's vehicle, which was in 
the immediate surroundings, following his arrest.  A 
unanimous Court in dismissing the appeal stated: 
 
In our opinion the police officers were entitled to search 
the appellant and the car driven by him which was still in 
the immediate surroundings as an incident of the 
appellant's lawful arrest, in order to discover and 
preserve relevant evidence….The fact that the search 
and seizure were not conducted immediately upon arrest, 
but only after the refusal of an unnecessary search 
warrant did not interfere with this entitlement. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Residential Searches 
 
It is "well recognized that the 
home is granted the highest 
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unwanted state intrusions36". In 
proper circumstances, a search 
may be conducted of a residence, 
or parts thereof, as an incident 
to arrest37.  
 
r example, in R. v. Golub (1997) 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 
nt.C.A.) police searched the residence of the 
cused following his arrest outside his door after he 
ited his apartment. The nature of the call involved a 
earm and the use of the police Emergency Task 
                                              
. v. Smellie (1994) 95 C.C.C. (3d) 9 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 
97) C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.) 
. v. Charlton (1992) 15 B.C.A.C. 272 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Polashek (1999) 134 C.C.C. 
) 187 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Smellie (1994) 95 C.C.C. (3d) 9 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to 
.C. refused (1997) C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.) 
. v. Evans (1996), 104 C.C.C (3d) 23 (S.C.C.) 
. v. Concepcion (1994) 48 B.C.A.C. 44 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Joly (1999) 118 O.A.C. 334 
t.C.A.) appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 18 (S.C.C.), R. v. Golub 
97) 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Bedard [1998] O.J. No.2087 (Ont.C.A.) 
6
 Force (tactical team). As a result of the search, a 
firearm was found under a bed mattress. The Court 
found that the police interest in protecting the safety 
of those at the scene outweighed the privacy interest 
of the individual and was therefore an exception to the 
warrant requirement in searching a dwelling house38. 
 
The primary focus on whether the search in a dwelling 
house is legal will rest on the lawfulness of the arrest. 
Thus, where a search of a hotel room used as a dwelling 
resulted in the seizure of papers that were strewn 
about the room, the papers could be lawfully seized 
provided the initial arrest was lawful39. In R. v. Joly 
(1999) 118 O.A.C. 334 (Ont.C.A.) appeal to S.C.C. 
dismissed [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 18 (S.C.C.), the police 
walkthrough of the accused’s apartment following his 
arrest in the apartment and brief examination of 
evidence in the bathtub was proper. However, the 
officer must recognize that the person's dwelling has a 
heightened expectation of privacy as compared to 
other places (ie. vehicles) and the scope of a search 
incidental to that arrest may be curtailed somewhat as 
to its spatial scope. Because of this increased privacy 
expectation in a home, officer safety may in some 
cases warrant a broader search power in a dwelling 
than gathering evidence40.  
 
Right to Counsel  
 
Although a person who is arrested must be advised of 
their right to counsel under s.10 of the Charter, an 
incidental search need not be suspended while the 
arrestee is afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
exercise that right41. The search may proceed but the 
police must cease questioning the arrestee until a 
reasonable opportunity to contact counsel is provided if 
the person asserts a desire to do so. 
 
Summary 
 
The enquiry into whether a search incidental to arrest 
will be reasonable will first hinge on the legality of the 
arrest. If the arrest is not lawful, the resultant search 
will not be lawful. If the arrest is valid, the second 
test will be whether the search was truly "incidental" 
to the arrest. The search must be undertaken for a 
purpose "connected" or "related" to the arrest, such as 
safety or evidence gathering, and will include focal, 
spatial, and temporal limits.  
                                                 
38 See also R. v. Bedard [198] O.J. No.2087 (Ont.C.A.) for a similar result. 
39 R. v. Chau (2000) Docekt:C31982 (Ont.C.A.) 
40 R. v. Golub (1997) 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont.C.A.) at p.210. 
41 R. v. Debot [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 (S.C.C.), R. v. Guberman (1985), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 
406 (Man. C.A.). 
 
The focal limit refers to the articles that are the 
subject, or focus, of the search including weapons or 
evidence. Reasonable grounds to believe such evidence 
(or weapons) will be found is generally not a 
prerequisite to this power of 
search, unlike swearing an 
information to obtain a search 
warrant. However, strip and body 
cavity searches do require 
greater justification. 
 
 
The spatial limit refers to the place or geographical 
area to be searched. This could include the person, a 
motor vehicle, a residence, or other place in which a 
person may have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The test 
is whether the targeted area of 
the search is properly 
circumscribed as “immediate 
surroundings”. A search that 
exceeds this boundary will not be 
authorized in its excess. 
 
 
The temporal limit refers to the 
search and the arrest. Generally, th
shortly after the arrest. However, 
carry out a search will not in all cas
validity of the search. Although the
adverse inferenc
this inference ca
reasonable expla
search may occu
provided reas
existed prior to
irrespective of th
 
Finally, the search must be conduct
manner. Legality alone will not sav
excessive in its execution. The poli
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demonstrate the physical manner, o
search was appropriate and was
otherwise disproportionate to the o
other circumstances of the situation
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must be carefully considered and du
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 IN CUSTODY ABANDONMENT: 
GUM TRICK VIOLATES 
CHARTER 
R. v. Nguyen, 
 (2002) Docket:C24776 (OntCA) 
 
Police arrested the accused for the 
discarded in the dry toilet bowl and a second stick on 
the return trip from the courthouse to the detention 
centre which was discarded in a trashcan in the 
security garage of the detention centre. On both 
occasions, the trial Court found that even though the 
police "presented the opportunity for the accused to 
unwittingly circumvent his decision not to supply bodily 
samples" and that they were banking on the accused's 
"ignorance or oversight about the possible murder of his distant cousin who had 
been sexually assaulted and brutally 
beaten to death. At one point the 
trial was put over for two weeks to 
permit a motion by Crown for an adjournment; an 
application for a general warrant to obtain bodily 
samples and dental impressions was going to be made. 
Prior to the two week returnable date, the police and 
Crown conspired to circumvent the accused's refusal 
(on the advice of his counsel) to provide DNA, by 
offering the accused a piece of chewing gum with the 
hope that it would be chewed and discarded. The plan 
involved the following steps that were summarized by 
the trial judge as follows: 
 
• "Two female police officers were selected to 
transport the accused in an attempt to create an 
atmosphere conducive to acceptance of the gum. 
• "The officers were to respond if spoken to and were 
to participate in conversation unrelated to the case. 
The sliding window into the back seat of the police 
car was left open for this purpose.  
• "Gum was to be offered, officer to officer, 
accepted, and then offered to the accused. 
Acceptance by the accused was to be voluntary. The 
officers were not to suggest, persuade or insist. 
They were neither to ask for the return of the 
chewed gum, nor to suggest the accused discard it. 
If the accused swallowed the gum or put it in his 
pocket, nothing was to be done. If the gum was 
discarded, they were to retrieve it. 
• "The toilet bowl in the court house security cell was 
drained. Paper towelling was placed to catch anything 
dropped in the bowl. A clean waste basket was placed 
outside the cell to provide another opportunity for 
the accused to deposit the gum. 
 
The plan was successful and on two occasions the 
accused accepted, chewed, and discarded a piece of 
gum which was seized without a warrant and submitted 
for DNA analysis; one piece of gum on the way from 
the detention centre to the courthouse which was 
consequences flowing from abandoning chewed gum" 
(DNA), they did not encourage or persuade him; the 
accused voluntarily accepted and chewed the gum 
"entirely independent of police suggestion or 
inducement other than the offer". At trial, the judge 
found the warrantless seizure valid because the 
accused could no longer claim a privacy interest in the 
discarded gum; therefore s.8 of the Charter was not 
triggered. Furthermore, the judge found the "trick" 
used by the police did not undermine the accused's 
refusal in providing body samples and therefore did not 
violate the privilege against self-incrimination.  The 
accused appealed his conviction to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the trial 
judge erred in admitting the DNA evidence derived 
from the chewing gum. 
 
S.7 Charter-Protection Against Self 
Incrimination 
 
When does a trick become so dirty that it amounts to 
an improper subversion of a person's freedom to 
choose whether to provide the DNA sample or not 
therefore violating their right against self-
incrimination? In describing the offer of gum in this 
case as a "passive" ploy, the trial judge found it similar 
to placing an undercover officer in a cell for no purpose 
but to listen, thereby creating an opportunity to speak 
with someone. Police offered no “active” deception, 
unfairness, threats, promises, coercion, persuasion, or 
inducement to accept, chew, return, or discard the 
gum. By offering the gum the police merely created the 
opportunity; taking advantage of that opportunity was 
dependent on the accused. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal agreed with the trial judge in finding the trick 
acceptable. 
 
S.8 Charter-Unreasonable Seizure 
 
Normally, where a person who is not in custody 
discards an item such as a cigarette butt, the police 
may collect the item without a warrant or without 
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 consent because the person relinquishes their privacy 
interest in the item discarded. However, a person in 
custody cannot prevent the police from retrieving the 
item. A person in custody who produces items 
containing bodily fluids will have no choice but to 
discard those substances in receptacles under police 
control. Whether a person relinquishes any privacy 
interest in the samples while in custody will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the 
Crown conceded that the warrantless seizure of the 
gum constituted a violation of the accused's s.8 
Charter rights. However, despite the s.8 breach, the 
DNA evidence was admissible under s.24(2) of the 
Charter because the administration of justice would 
not be brought into disrepute by its admission. 
Consequently, the appeal from conviction was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
PRIVATE PORNOGRAPHY 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE: 
CONDITIONAL SENTENCE 
REASONABLE 
R. v. Schan,  
(2002) Docket:C36525 (OntCA) 
 
Ontario’s Court of Appeal recently 
ENTRY TO ARREST LAWFUL: 
ALL EVIDENCE NEED  
NOT BE DESTROYED 
R. v. Duong and Tran, 2002 BCCA 43 
 
Police officers who were responding 
to a home invasion canvassed the 
neighbourhood for possible 
witnesses. One of the officers 
approached the front door of a 
residence and knocked. As a male opened the door, the 
officer felt a rush of warm, humid air carrying the 
odour of both burning and growing marihuana. As the 
officer questioned the male about the home invasion he 
observed a female standing inside the house. The 
officer described the male at the door as “fidgety”, 
rocking on his heels, looking over his shoulder, avoiding 
eye contact, and attempting to pull the door closed 
behind him. The officer called for backup and after a 
second officer arrived, the male and female were 
arrested inside the residence for growing marihuana. 
The officers then checked the residence to satisfy 
themselves there were no other persons present. While 
inside the residence the police made several 
observations including a padlocked basement door, fans 
humming in the basement, and a locked rear basement 
door. The two arrested occupants were transported to 
the police lockup while police obtained a search 
warrant. A search warrant was executed resulting in varied the sentence of an accused 
who pled guilty to possessing child 
pornography. Although the trial 
judge properly focused on the evils of child 
pornography and the principles of denunciation and 
deterrence in passing sentence, he did not properly 
focus on the fact the accused only downloaded the 
pornographic images for his own use and did not 
distribute the material. Furthermore, the accused’s 
marriage and relationship with his children had ended, 
he suffered from depression, and attempted suicide. 
As a result, the Appeal Court substituted an 18 month 
conditional sentence. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Freedom is not the sole prerogative of the lucky few 
but the right of all human beings.” Author unknown. 
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rom the basement and other evidence linking the 
rrested occupants to the premises. At trial, the 
vidence was admitted and the accused were convicted 
f producing marihuana and possession for the purpose 
f trafficking. The accused appealed their convictions 
rguing the police violated their right under the 
harter to be secure from unreasonable search or 
eizure and that the evidence should be excluded 
ecause the police did not have reasonable grounds on 
hich to base either the arrests or the search 
arrant, nor were there exigent circumstances 
ustifying entry to effect the arrests or the walk 
hrough search following the arrests.  
awful entry to effect arrest? 
ince the decision in R. v. Feeney [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, 
ntry to effect an arrest in a dwelling house is 
enerally prohibited unless the police are in fresh 
ursuit or in cases of exigent circumstances. Section 
9
 529.1 of the Criminal Code, Parliament’s response to 
the Feeney decision, allows the police to enter a 
residence without a warrant to effect an arrest if the 
following three preconditions are satisfied: 
 
1. the police have the power of arrest under 
s.495(1)(a) or (b),  
2. reasonable grounds the person is within the 
residence exist; and 
3. it would not be practicable to obtain a warrant 
because of the existence of exigent 
circumstances.  
 
Were the arrests lawful?  
 
Section 495(1) of the Criminal Code permits an arrest 
for an indictable offence based on reasonable grounds. 
Reasonable grounds require a subjective belief held by 
the officer that is supported by objective criteria. The 
following grounds offered by the arresting officer, and 
accepted by the trial judge, were sufficient: 
 
• the odour detected at the door; 
• the humid, warm air coming from the house; 
• the demeanour of the male answering the door; and 
• the officer’s experience in the field with the 
distinct odour of growing marihuana 
 
Grounds to believe person(s) present? 
 
This precondition was satisfied because the officer 
saw the accused in the residence. 
 
Exigent Circumstances? 
 
Exigent circumstances are defined in the Code as 
including circumstances where the officer believes, on 
reasonable grounds, that entry is necessary to prevent 
the imminent loss or destruction of evidence relating 
to an indictable offence. The standard for assessing 
the existence of exigent circumstances is reasonable 
grounds. In other words, did the officer believe 
exigent circumstances existed and was that belief 
supported by objective criteria? In this case, the trial 
judge concluded exigent circumstances existed after 
accepting the officer’s testimony that: 
 
• if he left to get a warrant the accused could 
escape and he would subsequently be unable to 
identify him; 
• the accused and anyone else inside could destroy 
evidence; 
• because of an officer shortage that evening he 
would have difficulty obtaining additional officers  
to watch the house; and  
• he was dealing with an ‘active’ crime rather than 
one that could be dealt with later. 
 
The accused argued that a commercial marihuana grow 
operation could not be dismantled and destroyed in the 
hour it would have taken the officer to obtain the 
warrant, unlike a quantity of cocaine which could easily 
be destroyed. Although the court agreed that the 
operation could not be completely destroyed, other 
evidence linking the accused to the operation, such as 
documents and fingerprints on equipment could be 
made unavailable had the accused been left inside the 
home for that hour. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal refused to interfere with the trial judge’s 
conclusion that exigent circumstances existed. 
 
Entry as an Incident to Arrest? 
 
In addition to the entry being lawful under the 
warrantless entry provisions of the Code, the appellate 
Court also examined whether the entry of the premises 
and the initial search were lawful as an incident to 
arrest at common law. For a search to be incident to 
arrest, the following threefold test must be satisfied: 
 
1. the arrest must be lawful 
2. the search must be for a valid investigatory 
objective  
3. the search must be conducted in a reasonable 
manner 
 
Since the arrest was lawful, the Appeal Court found 
the officer’s “entry of the premises without a warrant 
to ensure its security and to preserve evidence was a 
lawful incident of that arrest and was not carried out 
in an unreasonable manner”. The entry and search were 
therefore lawful at common law.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Innocent people are inevitably caught up in the 
criminal processes and those who prefer to be hostile 
and unco-operative with the police in the conduct of 
their duties are more likely to suffer unfortunate 
consequences”. SaskCA Justice Wakeling42 
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42 Schell V. Truba et al. [1990] S.J. No.547 (SaskCA) 
 2001 ENHANCED 
COUNTERATTACK ROADCHECK 
STATISTICS 
 
The Enhanced Counterattack 
Roadcheck statistics for British 
Columbia police forces are in for 
2001. Ending December 31, 2001 
there were a total of 4,727,195 
vehicles checked, 23,729 roadside BAC screenings, 726 
standard field sobriety tests, and 148 drug recognition 
expert screenings. As a result, a grand total of 741  
impaired driving charges were processed (up from 732 
in 2000), 832 administrative driving prohibitions and 
10,376 (1,016 for drugs) 24 hour prohibitions were 
served.  Finally, 21,317 violation tickets were written 
and 442 other Criminal Code charges were laid. The 
statistics for BC’s municipal police departments are as 
follows: 
 
Department Vehicles 
checked 
Roadside 
BACs 
Impaired 
charges 
215s 
Abbotsford 153,804 759 7 290 
Central 
Saanich 
84,197 224 24 106 
Delta 150,397 694 10 256 
Esquimalt 76,509 168 10 68 
Nelson 23,309 123 5 66 
New 
Westminster 
165,565 413 9 195 
Oak Bay 35,881 218 1 59 
Port Moody 59,745 150 1 87 
Saanich 154,582 455 7 204 
Vancouver 837,270 5,238 10 2,102 
Victoria 268,215 2,015 20 570 
West 
Vancouver 
213,120 1,172 22 422 
 
The Cowichan Valley RCMP generated the most 
impaired driving statistics. They checked 91,511 
vehicles resulting in 134 charges (up from 68 in 
2000). 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“The driving of a motor vehicle is neither a God-given 
nor a constitutional right. It is a licensed activity 
that is subject to a number of conditions, including 
the demonstration of a minimum standard of skill and 
knowledge pertaining to driving…” SCC Justice Cory43 
                                                 
43 Gaslake v. O’Donnell [1994] 1 S.C.R. 670 
SEIZED JOURNALS 
ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Anderson  
(2002) Docket:C33913 (OntCA) 
 
Police executed a search warrant 
and seized journals encompassing 
the several year time frame relating 
to several charges against the 
accused. The journals consisted of 
500-1,000 pages of handwritten notes; some 
exculpatory and some inculpatory. At trial, the Court 
excluded the journals finding their admission in the 
trial would violate the accused’s right to silence and 
the principle against self incrimination protected under 
the Charter. On appeal by Crown, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal recognized that both rights are embodied in 
the Charter, but they are not absolute. The right to 
silence is triggered when the accused, in a criminal 
proceeding, is subject to the coercive powers of the 
state through detention or “when an adversarial 
relationship arises between the individual and the 
state”. The principle against self-incrimination may 
“mean different things, at different times, in different 
contexts”.  
 
In this case, the police did not elicit the statements 
contained in the journals; they were created before 
any police investigation, detention, or arrest. The 
statements were not made under compulsion, coercion, 
or after detention or arrest, nor was there an 
adversarial relationship at the time the entries were 
made. The Crown appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
USE OF DEER DECOY NOT 
ENTRAPMENT 
R. v. Sigurdson, 2002 BCPC 0019 
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The accused was convicted of 11
hunting with the aid of a light, 
hunting during prohibited hours, and 
discharging a firearm on or across a 
highway contrary to the Wildlife 
Act.  Conservation officers had set up a deer decoy at 
night along a road outside the Williams Lake area.  The 
accused, who was driving along the roadway in the 
 company of another person, stopped, loaded his rifle, 
and fired two shots at the decoy.  The accused 
attempted to leave the area but was stopped, arrested, 
and subsequently released.  After being found guilty of 
these charges, the accused argued that he had been 
entrapped by the conservation officers on three 
grounds.  First he argued, the area targeted by 
conservation officers was outside the geographic area 
where reports about this kind of illegal activity had 
been occurring.  Second, the decoy operation was 
designed to entrap persons.  Finally, the decoy itself 
was “so spectacular a trophy that he could not resist 
it”; “the size and symmetry of the rack on the decoy 
was of such quality that it proved to be an irresistible 
lure”.  
 
The test for entrapment is two fold:  
• Were the police acting on a reasonable suspicion 
that the person is engaged in criminal activity or 
were they acting pursuant to a bona fide inquiry in 
an area where particular criminal activity is likely 
occurring?, and 
• Even if they had a reasonable suspicion or were 
acting on a bona fide inquiry, did they go beyond 
providing an opportunity and induce the commission 
of an offence?   
 
In this case, the judge found the police were engaged 
in a bona fide investigation, acted reasonably in what 
they did, and did not go beyond providing an 
opportunity.  Largely based on the evidence of the 
conservation officers, the judge found the antlers on 
the deer were “neither exceptional in size or symmetry 
so as to act as an extraordinary lure to law abiding 
members of the public”. The defence of entrapment, 
which could result in a judicial stay of proceedings, had 
not been made out. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
MISTATEMENT OF 
PUNISHMENT RENDERS 
CONFESSION INADMISSIBLE 
R v. Monk and Alexis, 2002 BCCA 103 
 
The accused was arrested by police 
t
which the police later used to develop a theme that if 
the accused accepted responsibility he could build on 
his hopes for the future.  The police officer developed 
a rapport with the accused and after talking to him for 
about two hours, obtained a confession. Prior to the 
confession, the accused asked the officer if the judge 
would reduce his sentence if he cooperated.  The police 
officer advised the accused that the judge would have 
to sentence him to no less than ten years in jail.  
However, the police did not advise the accused that 
the minimum sentence for conviction on second degree 
murder was life imprisonment without parole for at 
least ten years.  The trial judge was satisfied that the 
accused believed he was facing a ten-year sentence and 
not a life sentence.  As a consequence, the trial judge 
ruled the statement inadmissible; it was induced by the 
hope of a ten-year sentence with a chance of early 
release (2/3 of a ten year sentence). In rejecting the 
Crowns appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
stated: 
 
[I]t was open to the trial judge to conclude that [the 
accused] was induced to confess so that he could secure 
a minimum ten year sentence….The inducement was 
implicit rather than express. Neverthe-less, the 
constable ventured into a high risk area…as “[t]he 
classic ‘hope of advantage’ is the prospect of leniency 
from the courts”. (references omitted) 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ASD SAMPLE PREMATURE: 
RESULTS UNRELIABLE  
R. v. Burns, 2002 ABQB 135 
 
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal on a charge of driving while 
over 80mg% because the police 
officer should have waited fifteen 
minutes from the time of the 
accused’s last drink before administering the approved 
screening device (ASD).  The accused told the officer 
that he had a “few beer” and his last drink was about 
ten minutes before the stop.  The officer made a 
demand requiring the accused provide a sample into an 
ASD.  As a result, a fail was registered and from that 
result alone, the officer formed reasonable grounds 
V
Mfor murder.  After the arrest, he 
contacted a lawyer and refused to 
talk to the police on the advice of 
counsel.  Nonetheless, he did reveal 
hat he wished to become a youth probation counselor 
olume 2 Issue 3 
arch 2002 and read the breathalyzer demand. Consequently, the 
accused complied and provided a sample in excess of 80 
mg%. At trial, the judge found the officer knew she 
should have waited fifteen minutes and by not doing so 
the “fail” reading was unreliable. An RCMP crime 
12
 laboratory analyst was called by the defence and 
testified the fifteen minute waiting period after a last 
drink ensured the dissipation of any alcohol which may 
affect the reliability of the test. As a consequence, 
the officer’s belief to support the breathalyzer 
demand based solely on the “fail” was not reasonable 
because she knew the reading was unreliable. The 
resultant certificate of breath samples was obtained 
as a result of a Charter violation and was ruled 
inadmissible. In rejecting the Crown’s appeal, the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Justice stated: 
 
The requirement to wait 15 minutes to ensure the 
reliability of the analysis arises only where the police 
officer is inclined to believe the suspect’s claim of recent 
alcohol consumption. …[A] police officer is entitled to 
disbelieve the suspect, presumably with articulable 
reasons for doing so.  In such a case, there will be no 
doubt in the officer’s mind regarding the reliability of 
the ASD results  
 
I conclude … that when an officer has reason to believe 
or suspect that alcohol has been consumed within 15 
minutes, the officer should delay administering the test 
to ensure that the ASD results are reliable.  However, 
where there is no credible evidence that the suspect was 
drinking within 15 minutes, then the screening analysis 
should be administered as soon as reasonably possible.   
 
The appeal court judge refused to interfere with the 
trial judge’s decision and the acquittal was upheld. 
 
Complete case at www.albertacourts.ca 
 
SEARCH WARRANT FOR 
HOUSE PERMITS SEARCH OF 
VEHICLE ON PROPERTY 
R. v. Nguyen, Pham, and Vu,  
2002 BCPC 0012  
 
Police were in possession of a search 
p
p
b
l
t
t
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vehicles. After reviewing the applicable case law, 
Justice Maughan found there to be no breach: 
 
In the case at bar, police searched the residence and 
found evidence of an active and extensive marihuana 
production. Indications by way of food and clothing and 
personal items tended to show the house was occupied by 
at least one person. They also found documents 
pertaining to [the accused] Vu which tended to indicate 
he had some connection with the residence, storage of 
items such as ballast[s] to be used in marihuana 
production and finally two sets of car keys which opened 
the two vehicles parked in the back yard. The sets of 
keys which opened the Honda also opened locks for the 
residence, including one of two locks securing the 
basement entry to the marihuana grow area.  
 
Because of the clandestine nature of marihuana growing 
operations, it is reasonable to expect the materials used 
to operate such an enterprise and the final production 
results of the enterprise were likely transported on an 
ongoing basis to and from the residence in private motor 
vehicles. The vehicles parked behind the residence had 
been observed there for at least a few hours, so that it 
cannot be said their presence on the property was 
momentary or incidental. The documents found in the 
vehicles were quickly and easily located and did not 
apparently involve any dismantling of the vehicle.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Editor’s Note: The Court distinguished this case from 
British Columbia Supreme Court case (R. v. Brown 
(1997) B.C.J. No. 2642) where the search of a vehicle 
not mentioned in the warrant was found to be 
unreasonable. In that case, the police searched and 
found drugs in a residence not belonging to the 
accused.  They also found a car key dropped by a third 
party. They searched the car they knew belonged to 
the accused which was parked partly on the driveway. 
Inside the vehicle police found decks of cocaine with 
the accused’s fingerprints on them. Romilly J. found 
the police did not have reasonable grounds to believe 
there were drugs in the vehicle, exigent circumstances 
V
Mwarrant that authorized the search 
of a residence but was silent about 
the search of two vehicles on the 
roperty. After finding two sets of keys in the home, 
olice opened and searched the vehicles parked in the 
ack yard area of the property. In one vehicle, police 
ocated photographs and documents which were 
endered at trial as evidence.  The accused Vu argued 
hat his s.8 Charter right to be secure against 
nreasonable search and seizure had been violated 
ecause the police did not have a warrant to search the 
did not exist, and there was no search incident to 
arrest.  As a consequence the evidence in the Brown 
case was ruled inadmissible. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Six ways to bury a good idea; it will never work; we’ve 
never done it that way before; we’re doing fine without 
it; we can’t afford it; we’re not ready for it; and it’s not 
our responsibility”. Author unknown 
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 CARE & CONTROL: BEDROOM 
DEFENCE ACCEPTED 
R. v. Bishop, 2002 BCPC 0006 
 
The accused had consumed seven to 
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DOCUMENTS & ‘HIGHLY 
AROMATIC’ ODOUR PROVE 
POSSESSION 
R. v. Nguyen, 2002 BCPC 0040 
  
V
Meight beer at a motel pub after having 
driven there following an argument 
with his spouse. Not wanting to go 
home and not having enough money to 
urchase a motel room nor anywhere else to go, the 
ccused decided to sleep in his pickup truck until 
orning. During his sleep, the accused awoke and 
tarted his truck to allow the heater to warm the 
nterior, but later fell asleep with the engine running. 
olice found the accused asleep in his truck slumped 
ehind the steering wheel. The engine was running, the 
utomatic transmission was in park, and the emergency 
rake was on, as well as the radio. As a result, the 
ccused was charged with being in care control of a 
otor vehicle while impaired and having a blood alcohol 
evel in excess of 80 mg%.  
t trial, the Crown relied on the presumption found in 
.258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code which provides that a 
erson who occupies the operator’s seat of a vehicle is 
eemed to have care control of the vehicle unless they 
rove that they did not occupy that position for the 
urpose of setting the vehicle in motion. In this case, 
he trial judge accepted the evidence of the accused 
hat his intent was to sleep in the vehicle rather than 
o occupy the driver’s seat for the purpose of setting 
he vehicle in motion. Furthermore, the Crown was 
nable to establish care and control independent of the 
resumption.  In dismissing the charges, Gill J. at para. 
1 stated:     
In the case at bar there is no dispute that the vehicle’s 
motor was running.  However given that the transmission 
was in “Park” with the emergency brake activated and the 
accused asleep, I conclude that the risk of the accused 
unintentionally putting the vehicle in motion, which would 
have required a number of discrete steps on his part, was 
negligible.  His explanation, that because he had no place 
to stay he did not intend to drive until the next morning, 
combined with the fact that his vehicle was parked in a 
motel parking lot and away from any road traffic, renders 
any possibility that he may have awakened, changed his 
mind and driven away, speculative.  The element of care 
control not having been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the matter is dismissed.   
omplete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
Police responded to a report by a 
olume 2 Issue 3 
arch 2002 neighbour of a break and enter at a 
residence where police found suspects 
nearby in possession of large plastic 
bags containing marijuana.  Police then 
went to the home and entered to secure it and ensure 
there were no other suspects present.  No one else was 
located but a marijuana grow operation was discovered.  
Police returned with a warrant, searched the premises, 
and located 111 marijuana plants and several pieces of 
documentary evidence. The accused, who was not 
present at the home, was charged with unlawfully 
producing marihuana and possession of marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking. There was no direct 
evidence that the accused had ever been present or 
seen in the home and there were no fingerprints 
relating her to the operation, nor were any keys for 
the premises found in her possession.  
 
In this case, the Crown relied on circumstantial 
evidence and the doctrine of constructive possession 
set out in s.4(3) of the Criminal Code.  The trial judge 
found that there was circumstantial evidence of the 
accused’s presence at some point in the house 
established through the existence of her personal 
documents in the home. Police found a tenancy 
agreement signed by the accused, a report of the 
rental premises and contents, a hydroponic feeding 
program, utilities bills, Visa bills, and banking 
documents with the accused name and address, a 
photograph of the accused, personal cheques, a life 
insurance payment in the name of the accused, and 
automobile driver insurance. The landlord also testified 
that he leased the residence to the accused and her 
daughter and the rent was paid by post-dated cheques 
in the name of the accused.  
 
To establish constructive possession under the Code, 
the Crown must prove that the accused had both 
control over and knowledge of the marihuana grow 
operation. Control does not necessarily mean actual 
physical control but some power or authority over the 
drugs. In this case, the trial judge found the accused 
had control over the premises because she was the 
lessee, provided the post dated cheques for the rent 
14
 to the landlord, and the hydro, telephone, and cable 
were in her name. In taking judicial notice that growing 
marihuana is a “highly aromatic plant” along with the 
presence of the dated documents found at the home, 
the judge was satisfied that the accused had taken the 
documents there and therefore would have known 
about the grow because of the odour. Furthermore, the 
accused was paying the $400 a month hydro bill. In 
finding possession proven, Challenger J. stated: 
 
With respect to the evidence of other possible persons 
in the home, I have considered s.4(3)(b) and the doctrine 
of constructive possession.  It is clear [the accused] had 
control of the premises as the lessee, as the payer of the 
rent and utilities.  Whether others were utilizing the 
premises does not negate her control, according to all of 
the evidence before me, nor her knowledge.  I also note 
that the other person who apparently resided at that 
home was closely connected to the accused, sharing life 
insurance and car insurance.           
 
As a result, the accused was convicted of both counts. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS DO 
NOT BAR CIVIL SUIT 
Vlad v. Edmonton (City) Police Service, 
2002 ABQB 108 
 
The plaintiff was convicted of the 
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proceeding” and by asking the civil court to come to a 
different conclusion the plaintiff is launching a 
collateral attack on the convictions. Furthermore, the 
defendants allege his claim is “frivolous and vexatious 
and an abuse of court process”.  
 
On the other hand, the plaintiff argued that this 
proceeding was not a collateral attack on the criminal 
proceedings but finds merit in Charter breaches not 
addressed at the criminal trial such as a strip search 
conducted at police headquarters following his arrest. 
Moreover, the plaintiff alleges that the actions of the 
police contributed to his inability to find work following 
this incident.  
 
In finding that the plaintiff has an inability to raise 
funds and an order for security costs would 
“effectively end” the lawsuit, Moreau J. held it would 
not be just and reasonable in this case to require him 
to post security for costs and dismissed the 
defendants’ application. Furthermore, the Court was 
“unable to say that the plaintiff’s case is plainly 
without merit” because the plaintiff’s allegations were 
not specifically ruled upon at the criminal trial. The 
civil trial is set for spring 2002.  
 
Complete case at www.albertacourts.ca 
 
DUTY TO BE AWARE OF 
WARRANT LIMITATIONS 
V
MCriminal Code offences of assaulting a 
police officer with the intent to 
resist arrest and obstructing a police 
officer in the execution of his duty 
nd offences under Alberta’s Highway Traffic Act of 
unning a red light and failing to stop for police.  His 
ppeals from conviction were dismissed by Alberta’s 
ourt of Queen’s Bench, the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
nd the Supreme Court of Canada. The accused, now 
laintiff, seeks damages against the defendants 
dmonton police chief, Edmonton City Police Service, 
nd a named police constable in the amount of $3 
illion alleging unreasonable use of force and Charter 
reaches. The defendant police applied to the Alberta 
ourt of Queen’s Bench for an order requiring the 
laintiff post a security for costs of the court 
roceedings; they argue that the plaintiff has 
nsufficient funds to pay the estimated $96,000 
efence costs if he loses. They also argued that “the 
vents giving rise to the criminal convictions are 
xactly the same as those giving rise to the civil 
R. v. Kyllo, Lubkey, & Toupin,  
2001 BCCA 528 
 
The three accused appealed their 
convictions to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal. They were convicted 
of robbery and in addition, the 
accused Kyllo was convicted of murder. Although the 
three judge appellate panel overturned their 
convictions on the basis of an improper instruction by 
the judge to the jury, Hubbard J.A. made additional 
comments concerning the execution of the search 
warrant that are worth noting. 
 
When the accused was arrested at his home the police 
observed a pair of boots on the porch by the back 
door. A warrant was later applied to search the whole 
house but one was granted only for a search of the 
“curtilage” of the house; limiting the search to the 
perimeter and area surrounding the outside of the 
home. Two officers executed the warrant and the 
olume 2 Issue 3 
arch 2002 
15
 boots, which later became important evidence in the 
trial, were seized from within the residence by an 
officer who did not obtain the warrant. He testified he 
thought the warrant was for the whole house while the 
officer who obtained the warrant testified he told him 
it was restricted to its perimeter. Although the trial 
judge concluded that the seizure of the boots violated 
s.8 of the Charter, she nevertheless admitted the non-
conscriptive evidence under s.24(2) because the 
violation was inadvertent, the execution of the warrant 
was “exemplary”, and the boots were important 
evidence. 
 
Hubbard J.A. however, described the breach as 
“serious” because the officer was “under a duty to 
make himself aware of the limitations of the warrant”. 
As was reasoned, if he had made himself aware, “he 
would have known he had no authority to enter and 
search the residence”.  Furthermore, even if the 
officer was confused about the word “curtilage” as 
Crown suggested, the officer has “a duty to clear up 
the confusion before executing [the warrant]”. 
Moreover, the fact the police carried out the search in 
an “exemplary” manner did not mitigate the seriousness 
of the breach. “Exemplary conduct is to be expected of 
investigating officers whether they enter a house with 
consent of the occupants or under the authority 
provided by a warrant”. Even if the officer made a 
“mistake” in this case, “the failure to make himself 
aware of the terms of the warrant before embarking 
on its execution demonstrates an absence of good 
faith”.  
 
The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
 ‘RESIDUAL’ PRIVACY 
INTEREST IN RECOVERED 
STOLEN PROPERTY 
R. v. Law et al., 2002 SCC 10 
 
The accused’s locked safe, which was 
stolen from a restaurant, was 
recovered by police after it was 
abandoned by thieves and found open 
in a field. An investigation into the 
theft was completed and the safe was placed in the 
exhibit room for return to the owner.  However, prior 
to its return another officer, aware of but 
unconnected to the theft investigation, acted on “a gut 
feeling” the accused were committing tax violations and 
examined the documents inside the safe. The officer 
took the documents, many of which he could not 
understand because they were written in Chinese 
characters, and photocopied them without a warrant or 
without consent. The documents provided financial 
evidence for offences under the Excise Tax Act. At 
trial, the judge held the accused’s righs under s.8 of 
the Charter were breached and the evidence was 
excluded. This was upheld by the New Brunswick Court 
of Queen’s Bench but was overturned by the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal. The principle question on 
further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
whether the accused, as owners of the safe, 
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
documents? 
 
Unlike the principle of abandonment where a person 
voluntarily relinquishes or discards an item, the 
documents were locked in a safe that was stolen; the 
accused did not participate in the safe’s ‘abandonment’ 
in the field. “The mere fact that the police recover 
lost or stolen property is insufficient to support an 
inference the owner voluntarily relinquished his 
expectation of privacy”. Although it would be expected 
that the police would conduct an investigation of the 
contents to determine the thief, such as a fingerprint 
analysis, the examination did not extend to the pursuit 
of totally unrelated hunches. Bastarache, J. for the 
unanimous Supreme Court held the accused “retained a 
residual, but limited, reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the contents of their stolen safe” and “one would 
have expected the stolen property to remain private 
following its recovery, as it was before its theft”.  
 
Furthermore, the plain view doctrine, which permits 
the seizure of inadvertently discovered and 
immediately obvious evidence coming within the view of 
a lawfully positioned officer, was of little assistance 
because their was nothing facially wrong with the 
documents. In fact, the officer did not inadvertently 
detect anything incriminating through the unaided use 
of his senses; it wasn’t until after the documents were 
translated that the officer formed his grounds. The 
appeal was allowed and the evidence ruled inadmissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
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